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Aggregate litigation has become an integral part of the U.S. civil justice system, used  in
cases as varied as civil rights, securities and mass torts.  Aggregate litigation, however,  is often
the cause of intense controversy among the private bar, the bench, and the academy.  At its best,
it creates substantial efficiencies and expands participation in the civil justice system.  At its
worst, it skews outcomes, takes legal power out of the hands of litigants and extracts meritless
settlements from businesses.  With this in mind, in 2009 the American Law Institute completed a
project on “Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation” (“Aggregation Project”), whose goal
was to “identify good procedures for handling aggregate law suits”2 and the “ways of governing
them that promote their efficiency and efficacy as tools for enforcing valid laws.”3  The principal
authors of the Aggregation Project were Professors Samuel Issacharoff, Richard Nagareda, and
Charles Silver and Dean Robert Klonoff.
The completion of the Aggregation Project in 2009 spurred a host of reactions from
attorneys, judges, and scholars from around the nation.  On March 12, 2010, The George
Washington University Law School’s James F. Humphreys Complex Litigation Center hosted a
symposium with almost all of the leading scholars on complex and aggregate litigation in the
academy.    The questions posed by these scholars included: What is the optimal level of
aggregation?  When is class action litigation appropriate?  Where did the Aggregation Project
get it right, and where did it go wrong?  
The four panels at the symposium and the resulting articles respond to these questions
and more, provide valuable insight into the current state of aggregate litigation and offer
normative arguments for changes in current practice.  The participants in the symposium agreed
that, in general, the Aggregation Project was a significant and  positive step forward in clarifying
and making coherent the law attending aggregate litigation.  Many of the scholars present,
however,  criticized important proposals and recommendations in the Aggregation Project. 
Others addressed issues in litigation outside of the Aggregation Project.  Some articles examined
class actions and others discussed non-class aggregation.   
The fifteen articles that follow in this symposium issue reflect a wide diversity of views
and subjects.  The symposium begins with the paper that resulted from Professor Deborah
Hensler’s keynote luncheon address.  She examines aggregate litigation outside of the United
States, finding a substantial increase in such litigation in the last decade.  At least 21 countries
4  The article of one of the symposium participants, Professor Howard Erichson, was published
in the Cornell Law Review.  See [add cite].
currently have adopted some type of class action; at least 6 countries have some form of
consolidated group proceeding.  Countries such as Israel, Canada and Australia with procedures
similar to ours have seen the greatest use of class actions.  By contrast, the Netherlands  has
developed an effective non-class aggregate litigation procedure to settle mass claims using very
different procedures.  The most intriguing cases arise against multi-national corporations in
which aggregate litigation is brought in both U.S. and foreign courts.  Professor Hensler
describes securities fraud litigation against Royal Dutch Shell involving both U.S. and Dutch
courts which raises novel issues.  Finally, Professor Hensler examines procedures for the funding
of class actions, noting that the U.S. is unique in its use of contingency fees and requiring
lawyers to fund their clients’ cases while other countries are experimenting with third party
financing of aggregate litigation.
Professors David Rosenberg and Linda Mullenix address choice-of-law issues.  Professor
Rosenberg examines which state’s law to apply when many states’ laws may be relevant to the
aggregate litigation whereas Professor Mullenix asks whether to apply federal or state law. 
Professors Patrick Wooley, Robert Bone and Edward Sherman examine the circumstances under
which  plaintiffs are adequately represented and when preclusion should or should not prevent
subsequent litigation.  Professor Jay Tidmarsh focuses on the optimal size of class actions and
when litigants should be extended opt-out rights.  
Professors Judith Resnik and Elizabeth Chamblee Burch address plaintiffs’ roles in
aggregate litigation.  They discuss  how the judicial system interacts with litigants and urge
increased communication between lawyers and plaintiffs and among plaintiffs.  Professor
Richard Marcus and Dean Alan Morrison discuss procedural issues in class actions, including
assessing the merits of a case in a class certification ruling, the role of objectors to a settlement
and procedures for aggregate litigation in other countries.  
Finally, Professors Thomas Morgan, Lester Brickman, Nancy Moore and Charles Silver
highlight ethical issues in aggregate litigation.  They focus on consolidation in non-class
aggregate litigation, advocating for and against the use of advance consent waivers that bind
plaintiffs and regulate plaintiffs’ lawyers fees.4  
Choice of Law
Professors David Rosenberg (along with co-author Luke McCloud) and Linda Mullenix
address two challenging choice-of-law issues in diversity class actions.  Professor Rosenberg
examines choice-of-law in multistate, diversity cases, noting that courts have often refused to
certify state law claims otherwise ripe for class treatment because of the need to apply diverging
or conflicting state laws to the claims of plaintiffs from different states.  The added cost and
complexity of applying the laws of 50 states makes the use of class treatment unappealing. 
Professor Rosenberg advocates applying the average of differing state laws and provides
guidance for implementing an average law solution to the management of this choice of law
problem.  He argues that the main justification for averaging state laws is that businesses already
make such a determination when calculating risk.  Businesses account for differences in state
law when predicting liability on a nationwide basis.  They balance potential liability against the
5 Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., No. 08-1008  (Slip Op. March 31, 2001).  
costs of taking additional precautions.  Professor Rosenberg offers an economic analysis
showing that businesses are most efficient when they take precautions resulting in expected
liability in between the most lenient state standard and the strictest state standard.  Professor
Rosenberg argues that multistate, diversity class actions merit special treatment in order  to
maximize efficiency and ensure that plaintiffs get a just outcome.  Average law could be used in
any case that would benefit from separating the determination of a defendant’s aggregate
liability from the distribution of any class-wide recovery.  
Professor Mullenix analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shady Grove
Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., (“Shady Grove”)5 in which the Court
addressed whether to apply a New York state law that would preclude class treatment of the
dispute or to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  She reviews the facts of the case, its
procedural history, the briefing and the oral argument, and thoroughly outlines the issues and
positions of the parties.  Professor Mullenix ultimately argues that the Shady Grove decision
saved federal class actions from dying a slow death through limitation by state legislation.
Preclusion and Adequate Representation
Professors Patrick Wooley, Robert Bone and Edward Sherman examine issues
surrounding preclusion and adequacy of representation in aggregate litigation.  An often
troubling element of aggregate litigation is that most  plaintiffs have little contact with their
attorneys despite the fact that their attorneys have a duty to represent their interests vigorously. 
Aggregate litigation has developed procedures that attempt to ensure adequate representation and
justify binding all parties to the outcome.  The key question is when preclusion should bind the
absent plaintiffs.  Professor Wooley focuses on whether and when an absent class member can
challenge a judgment on the basis of inadequate representation.  Professor Bone analyzes the
justifications for binding plaintiffs in aggregate litigation.  Professor Sherman assesses
circumstances and  techniques judges use to limit the scope of preclusion, including cases where
class counsel chooses not to bring all potential claims or where not all claims are common to the
class.  
Professor Wooley argues that the Due Process Clause grants absent class members the
right to collaterally attack a judgment on the basis of inadequate representation if the court did
not have personal jurisdiction over them.  He argues that the Aggregation Project does not fully
appreciate the link between adequate representation and personal jurisdiction.  A court presiding
over a proposed class action may render a judgment with preclusive effect only when it has
personal jurisdiction over the absent class member, which turns on notice and minimum
contacts.  Professor Wooley rejects the arguments of Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Richard
Nagareda that the proper certification of a class action under Rule 23 should effectively
foreclose an adequate representation objection by an absent class member.  Professor Wooley
contends that adequate representation does not serve as a substitute for notice, service of process,
minimum contacts or the reasonableness findings required for personal jurisdiction.  These
requirements must be satisfied as to absent class members; otherwise, class members should
have the ability to object, post-judgment, that they were not adequately represented by class
counsel.     
Professor Bone’s article looks to realign the doctrines of preclusion and adequate
representation with their justifications.  He notes flaws in both an outcome-based approach and a
process-based approach to the two doctrines.  An outcome-based approach has no need for
adequate representation and permits too much preclusion.  If the litigation results in the correct
outcome, it does not matter whether plaintiffs were adequately represented, and a second lawsuit
only wastes resources.  A process-based approach allows too little preclusion because the
process involves a day-in-court right for each plaintiff with individual control over major
litigation decisions.  Professor Bone argues against the prevailing justifications for preclusion
and adequate representation, including  “exceptionalism,” which views class actions as
administrative proceedings and allows plaintiffs to negotiate and contract away their rights. 
Instead, Professor Bone advocates rethinking the fit between justification and doctrine through a
redefinition and limiting of the process-based day-in-court right.  He argues that the day-in-court
right is really a flexible right that accommodates competing concerns.  Aggregate litigation deals
with groups rather than individuals; therefore, achieving collective social goals or improving
aggregate welfare should outweigh personal control in many situations.  The day-in-court right
must be flexible enough to accommodate both aggregation and broader nonparty preclusion,
including innovative case aggregation such as advance waivers by class members. 
Professor Sherman analyzes preclusion and adequate representation by examining
“abandoned claims,” which are claims that plaintiffs’ counsel could have pursued but choose not
to.  Some courts have held that class counsel’s abandonment of certain claims which precludes
those claims from being asserted in  future lawsuits can be grounds for a finding of  inadequate
representation.  As a result, courts and plaintiffs lawyers have developed techniques to avoid or
limit the preclusion of abandoned claims in aggregate litigation.  One area where courts have
reached conflicting holdings on the proper scope of preclusion is with respect to damages in
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions.  Professor Sherman also analyzes hybrid Rule 23 (b)(3) class
actions, which divide a proceeding into issues common to the class and individual issues, and 
Rule 23(c)(4) issue classes, where a court only certifies a class for certain issues.  He notes that
many courts have found issue classes to violate Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. 
Professor Sherman concludes by discussing how judges can supervise litigation to reduce the
risk of the unfair preclusion of claims through assessing the importance of claims and the
likelihood of claims being brought on an individual basis.
Optimal Number of Class Members
Professor Jay Tidmarsh, along with co-author Professor David Betson, analyzes the
optimal number of  members in a class, providing a normative economic account of when opt-
out rights should be afforded.  He analyzes Aggregation Project § 2.04, which focuses on
whether a remedy sought by the class is “divisible” which determines whether the court should
allows opt-outs or not. Focusing on class actions where individual claims are too small to be
viable on their own [i.e. “negative value” claims], he uses a marginal utility analysis, examining
the marginal benefit and marginal cost of including additional class members.  He finds that
where the marginal benefit of adding a class member exceeds the marginal cost of doing so, the
class has one equilibrium point.  In some situations, classes may have two equilibrium points.  In
that case, the optimal class size is where the expected net benefit of that size exceeds the net
benefit of any other size composed of fewer members.  Professor Tidmarsh discusses arguments
for allowing opt-out rights, and does not discount them.  He argues, however,  that if a class is an
optimal size, no opt-outs should be permitted, so as to maximize the social benefit the lawsuit
will create.  Finally, he contends that the “divisibility” standard for opt-out rights in the
Aggregation Project is misguided, and lawyers and courts should instead look to whether the
class size is optimal.
Plaintiffs’ Role in Aggregate Litigation
Professors Resnik and Burch examine plaintiffs’ roles in aggregate litigation and how the
judicial system can better serve plaintiffs, many of whom have no direct contact with the
proceedings.  They both argue that increased interaction among individual plaintiffs and between
plaintiffs and lawyers would help plaintiffs better articulate their desires and improve the
legitimacy of outcomes.  Professors Resnik and Burch differ on their approach to the
Aggregation Project; Professor Resnik views it as curtailing due process rights whereas
Professor Burch sees it as an opportunity to provide plaintiffs with more opportunities to
communicate.
In her article, Professor Resnik provides an historical account to explain how modern
conceptions of due process and procedural fairness have opened the courthouse door for a wide
variety of plaintiffs and claims.  The contemporary challenge is how to handle this mass of
claims while providing due process rights to all claimants.  Aggregate litigation is one technique
for doing so.  Professor Resnik sees two conceptions of due process in the Aggregation Project. 
The “due process model” views due process as best served through a public trial before a judge,
who controls the proceedings.  In contrast, lawyers dominate the “contractual model,” which
focuses on agreements between plaintiffs and lawyers and between the parties through
settlement.
Professor Resnik criticizes the Aggregation Project for curtailing due process rights of
absent class members.  She argues that it relies too much on the decision-making of lawyers and
judges and allows for too little litigant control.  She views open proceedings and communication
with litigants as essential to the fairness and legitimacy of the judicial system.  The Aggregation
Project supports  non-class settlements and advance waivers of adequacy of representation,
which are actions that have minimal judicial or public oversight.  She views this approach as
retreating from the goal of opening the courthouse door to all. 
Professor Burch examines procedural justice in non-class aggregate litigation and
considers how to strike the right balance between the individual and the collective when
designing process.  She takes the opposite position of Professor Resnik, arguing that Section
3.17(b) of the Aggregation Project presents an opportunity for lawyers and judges to provide
plaintiffs more opportunity to communicate and form groups with common interests and goals. 
Plaintiffs can negotiate over the most desirable outcome, especially involving non-monetary
remedies, and collectively determine the processes to aggregate and litigate their claims.  Such
communication is positive because it invests plaintiffs in the proceedings, provides for better
informed consent and legitimizes the outcome in the eyes of plaintiffs.  Increased
communication and fairer procedure, Professor Burch asserts, does not guarantee fair outcome. 
Therefore, § 3.18 of the Aggregation Project remains necessary.  Judges must provide a process-
dependent check on plaintiffs’ communications, and a limited review of the outcome, whether a
settlement or a verdict.  But ultimately increasing plaintiffs’ involvement in the process will
increase substantive justice.  
Procedural Issues in Class Actions
While Professor Richard Marcus and Dean Alan Morrison have a different focus, each
highlights the evolution of aggregation procedures in the United States legal system and abroad. 
6 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelyn, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
7 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008).
Professor Marcus focuses on the early stages of the litigation such as whether judges should
consider the merits of the case in making a certification decision.  Dean Morrison looks mostly
at later procedural stages, highlighting changes regarding class settlement objectors and
attorney’s fees
Professor Marcus notes that judges are increasingly making determinations as
“gatekeepers” on the merits of a case when granting or denying class certification.  He engages
in an historical analysis of the role of the judge in fashioning and approving aggregate litigation. 
He analyzes Eisen,6 a 1974 Supreme Court case which held that judges should not make a merits
determination when deciding class certification.  He notes that the role of judges as gatekeepers 
has expanded since 1974 and that gatekeeping is a traditional function of judges.  He
demonstrates how in recent years judges have moved away from Eisen, such as in In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation,7 in which the Third Circuit held that Eisen does not
preclude a merits inquiry necessary to make a Rule 23 determination.  Professor Marcus points
out the substantial consequences of this ruling.  Parties must engage in limited merits discovery
prior to class certification.  Fewer classes will be certified because plaintiffs cannot argue to the
judge that they will find essential information once merits discovery begins.  Judges must make
this pretrial “finding” on the merits without disturbing the jury’s right to independently find the
facts at trial.  Finally, more settlement classes will likely be certified because parties will be
farther along in the litigation process before certification occurs.  
Dean Morrison discusses changes in class action procedures over the past 40 years, many
of which are adopted in the Aggregation Project.  He argues that these changes have vastly
improved the process by which the fairness of a class settlement is evaluated.  He focuses on
objectors, noting that objecting has become significantly easier.  Today class members have a
longer time period in which to object and technology has allowed greater access to needed
information.  In contrast with Professor Marcus, Dean Morrison believes the “indivisible”
standard for determining opt-out rights in § 2.07 of the Aggregation Project is a positive
development because it focuses on the remedy for the class rather than whether injunctive or
monetary damages predominate.  Finally, Dean Morrison believes the Aggregation Project
shows progress on procedures for assessing “reasonable” attorneys fees.
Ethical Issues in Aggregate Litigation
Professors Thomas Morgan, Lester Brickman, Nancy Moore and Charles Silver examine
ethical issues in aggregate litigation.  They focus more closely on non-class aggregation, which
often has many of the features of class actions without the same procedural protections.  One
issue in non-class aggregation is that every plaintiff must individually consent to any settlement,
a level of unanimity that is difficult to obtain.  Professors Morgan, Brickman and Moore are all
critical of lawyers’ use of advance consent waivers to get around this difficulty.  Prof. Silver
writes in favor of such arrangements, arguing that the law governing lawyers is constraining
innovative techniques for dealing with aggregate litigation.  The articles also overlap by
questioning  appropriate fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers and the potential for unethical behavior by
lawyers presented with the possibility of large contingency fees.  
Professor Morgan highlights scenarios in which a lawyer might aggregate many
plaintiffs’ claims into one settlement.  He notes that both Section 3.17 of the Aggregation Project
and Rule 1.8(g) of the American Bar Association Model Rules would govern such a situation. 
He supports Rule 1.8(g), which he argues provides more protection for plaintiffs and less
potential for manipulation on the part of lawyers.  Specifically, advisory boards and courts have
interpreted Rule 1.8(g) to prohibit plaintiffs from consenting in advance of litigation to
procedures for accepting a potential settlement.  Such procedures often include a provision
allowing plaintiffs to accept a settlement through a less than unanimous vote of all plaintiffs. 
Professor Morgan argues that such procedures violate the ethical duties of  lawyers to represent
every plaintiff.  Section 3.17 of the Aggregation Project allows for such waivers under certain
conditions and with certain procedures for challenging an agreement.   Professor Morgan argues
that such a system is ripe for abuse.  When plaintiffs sign the waiver in advance of litigation they
do not know what the settlement terms might include.  In addition, informing every plaintiff
about the terms of a settlement is a difficult, but necessary procedure.  
Professor Brickman examines ethical issues surrounding plaintiffs’ lawyers contingency
fees in non-class aggregate litigation.  He argues that ethical rules such as ABA Rule 1.8(g) are
often forgotten or ignored when large fees are at stake.  He acknowledges that the unanimous
consent requirement for plaintiffs approving a settlement contributes to ethical problems because
of the possibility of holdouts and the incentive for lawyers to misrepresent the settlement to
induce consent.  However, he rejects the idea that most-or-nothing settlements, in which only 85
or 95 percent of plaintiffs must consent to a settlement, would be a better alternative.  
As a solution, Prof. Brickman suggests that courts enforce reasonable fee provisions in
certain cases.  Failing that, disciplinary committees should bring actions against lawyers who
appear to have colluded or otherwise not represented the interests of their clients.  To bring these
ethical issues into focus, Prof. Brickman uses the plaintiffs’ firm of Umphrey Burrow as an
example.  He highlights the firm’s actions litigating claims surrounding an explosion at Phillips
Petroleum’s Houston plant in 1989 that killed 23 people and wounded hundreds.  These actions
resulted in a malpractice suit that reached the Texas Supreme Court, which held that lawyers
who breach their fiduciary duty to their client can be required to forfeit their fees even where the
client cannot show actual damages resulting from the lawyers’ actions.   
Professor Moore focuses more on the Aggregation Project, and notes that it lacks a
meaningful discussion of ethical rules as they apply to lawyers in both class actions and non-
class aggregation.  She views this as a missed opportunity to provide much-needed guidance. 
Professor Moore also highlights provisions that she believes have adverse effects on ethical
behavior.  Particularly, she argues §1.04(a) inadvertently endorses the view that each member of
the class is an individual client of the lawyer in its reference to a lawyer “representing multiple
claimants in an aggregate proceeding.”  Professor Moore supports the opposing interpretation of
a class as an entity client when applying conflict of interest rules.  
She also criticizes the use of the term “structural conflict of interest” in § 2.07(a)(1),
which highlights how a court should come to a determination of adequacy of representation.  The
Aggregation Project does not define “structural conflict of interest,” and Professor Moore
believes the term could be interpreted to prevent certification of a class where a lawyer has any
conflict of interest between two individual class members.  In non-class aggregation, Professor
Moore raises similar issues as those of Professor Morgan and notes the particular need for
guidance in large aggregations, where lawyers view clients as similar to absent class members
but the judicial protection provided to class members do not apply.  She notes that the
Aggregation Project assumes these clients are in a position to protect themselves and are fully
informed of the proceedings which is not always the case.  
Professor Silver responds to Professors Morgan, Brickman, and Moore by asserting that
plaintiffs should be able to consent to procedures guiding the approval of a settlement, even
when a less than unanimous vote is required for approval.  Professor Silver views the lawyer-
client relationship as that of agent and principal, in which each group is interested in maximizing
its recovery.  Plaintiffs hire lawyers because they need expertise and lawyers keep contingency
fees at a certain level to induce plaintiffs to hire them.  Lawyers have an incentive to limit the
amount of effort they put into a case to the extent that it maximizes their fee per hour and
plaintiffs have an incentive to monitor lawyers to pressure lawyers to maximize the overall
recovery.  
Professor Silver believes participants in the judicial system should be able to create
innovative structures to deal with lawyer-client and client-client conflicts of interest, but that
rules governing lawyers often stifle such innovation.  Bar rules assume that ideals of individual
consent that apply in a single plaintiff setting must be extended to an aggregate setting.  Courts
have used bar rules as justification for preventing the types of advance consent agreements the
other ethics panelists criticize.  Professor Silver argues that current bar rules contribute to the
problem of lawyer misconduct rather than offer solutions to unethical behavior.
Conclusion
The fifteen papers in this symposium reflect the wide range of scholarly views which
attend class actions and non-class aggregate litigation.  While the ALI Aggregation Project
represents a dramatic step forward in our effort to make coherent the procedures by which our
courts manage aggregate litigation, many questions remain unsettled and hotly disputed.  Much
is at stake in this debate for without effective aggregate litigation procedures our ability to
provide justice efficiently to thousands of claimants with similar claims will remain in doubt. 
Just over six months after this symposium at GW, one of the youngest, yet most accomplished,
scholars in this field, Richard Nagareda, a co-author of the ALI Aggregation Project,
unexpectedly passed away.  This symposium issue is dedicated to him and to the zeal he brought
to the search for justice and equity in this controversial flash point in procedural theory.
